The purpose of this article is to understand and describe the growing rivalry between two regional powers on the African continent: Ethiopia and Egypt. This confrontation is mainly centered around the Nile, Africa’s largest river, one of whose tributaries, the Blue Nile, originates in Ethiopia before flowing into the river that sustains Egypt’s economy.
Beyond simple power struggles, tensions have taken on a whole new dimension since Ethiopia announced its plans in 2011 to build the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile. Intended to restore Ethiopia to its former glory, this monumental project has Cairo, and by extension Khartoum, trembling at the prospect of potential drought.
“The water of the Nile is a red line.” These words, heavy with meaning, were spoken by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. They were directed at the African countries south of Egypt, as many of them are home to the sources of the Nile, which flows through Egypt from south to north. More specifically, these remarks were directed at Ethiopia, which for several decades has been planning the construction of its “Grand Renaissance Dam,” and whose construction finally began in 2011. To understand the situation, it is necessary to analyze both points of view: on the one hand, Egypt and Sudan fear a reduction in water flow and the potential impacts on their populations, which are mainly concentrated along the river, and on the other hand, Ethiopia, which is facing a population explosion and seeing its energy and agricultural production needs grow.
At a time when geopolitical tensions related to natural resource management are on the rise, water has become a strategic issue of the utmost importance. According to the United Nations, more than 2 billion people already live in areas of water stress. Climate change, demographic pressure, and overexploitation are making this resource increasingly precious. In this global context, the case of the Nile, the second-longest river on the planet, stands out as a prime example of potential conflicts over water. This is not simply a localized conflict: it is a testing ground for the environmental rivalries of the 21st century.
We will explore these inter-state tensions through the arguments put forward by Egypt and Ethiopia, but also by conducting a geostrategic analysis of the region and the major and minor players involved. We will conclude with some potential projections.
With construction beginning in 2011, the “Great Renaissance Dam” quickly drew criticism from Egypt. The Nile flows through no fewer than 11 countries, making it a source of tension between Egypt and its neighbors, as the river is so precious to Cairo. Even in ancient times, Herodotus claimed that “Egypt is a gift from the Nile.” The river flows through the entire country, irrigating the narrow strip of fertile land where most of the country’s 105 million inhabitants live. With virtually no rainfall, the water of the Nile is a vital resource for agriculture, industry, and domestic use. This is because the state depends on the Nile for 95% of its freshwater supply. As a result, any variation in the river’s flow can have direct and potentially catastrophic consequences for food security, agricultural employment, and social stability.
Egypt’s fear is therefore existential. The Ethiopian dam, with a storage capacity of nearly 74 billion cubic meters, or almost the entire annual flow of the Blue Nile, represents a potential lever of pressure, even though Ethiopia officially claims that the GERD is only intended to generate electricity. For Egypt, the issue goes beyond the simple use of water: it is a matter of sovereignty, security, and even national survival. This explains the firmness of the political discourse in Cairo, but also the use of active and multilateral diplomacy aimed at internationalizing the issue.
From Ethiopia’s perspective, the GERD is the embodiment of a dream of power. The dam is seen as a source of national pride, financed almost exclusively by domestic contributions, outside the traditional channels of the World Bank or the IMF. This project illustrates Addis Ababa’s desire to emerge from decades of poverty and international marginalization. As Africa’s second most populous country, Ethiopia is experiencing rapid population growth. It faces pressing energy needs to fuel its industrial development, electrify rural areas, and support an economy in transition. The GERD, with its expected capacity of 6,450 megawatts, could make Ethiopia a regional electricity supplier and strengthen its geopolitical role in the Horn of Africa.
The construction of the GERD has nevertheless revived old legal disputes. Egypt relies on the 1929 and 1959 treaties, which guarantee it a majority share of the Nile’s flow and a veto right over any upstream projects. Ethiopia, which has never been party to these agreements, rejects their legitimacy, considering them a relic of the colonial era. This fundamental disagreement prevents the establishment of a common legal framework for the management of the river’s water resources. Attempts at mediation, notably by the African Union and the United States, have failed to find common ground on the timing and terms of filling the reservoir.
The filling of the dam, which Ethiopia began unilaterally in 2020, marked a major turning point. Cairo and Khartoum denounced it as a violation of the principle of cooperation. In 2021, then in 2022 and 2023, new filling phases were carried out, which increased mistrust. Periods of drought are a particularly sensitive issue: if the level of the Nile falls for several consecutive years, the filling of the GERD could limit the water available for downstream uses. Egypt fears that its dams (particularly the Aswan Dam) will be emptied, its agriculture will be endangered, and millions of citizens will be affected by a major water crisis.
Sudan, located between the two giants, plays an ambivalent role. On the one hand, it fears a negative impact on its dams and irrigation systems. On the other, it could benefit from better flood control and cheap energy supplies. However, internal conflicts have weakened the country’s ability to influence negotiations. Sudan remains torn between its technical interests and shifting diplomatic alliances.
The African Union (AU) has repeatedly attempted to act as mediator in the GERD crisis. Under South Africa’s presidency in 2020, rounds of negotiations were launched between the three countries, with the support of the AU Commission. However, the continental organization is hampered by its own limitations. It has neither coercive mechanisms nor legally binding arbitration powers. Furthermore, its members remain divided on the issue: some support Ethiopia in the name of the sovereignty of source countries, while others remain closer to Cairo. The AU therefore appears to be a symbolic diplomatic player, but one that is still too weak institutionally to influence the course of the conflict.
The conflict over the Nile also reflects broader geopolitical fault lines. The issue of water is part of a competition for influence between regional and international powers. China, the main investor in Africa, has interests in Ethiopian infrastructure, some of which are related to energy. Turkey, which is very active in Ethiopia economically, has more distant relations with Egypt. The United Arab Emirates plays a discreet but growing role, while Russia, through military and economic agreements, is seeking to strengthen its presence in the region. The United States, long close to Egypt, has attempted mediation without success, while the European Union has limited itself to calls for dialogue, due to a lack of consensus among its member states. At the same time, Ethiopia’s recent recognition of Somaliland’s sovereignty has encouraged Egypt to rally to Somalia’s cause in an attempt to contain Ethiopia’s growing influence.
The dispute over the GERD also highlights the lack of a global legal consensus on the equitable management of transboundary rivers. The 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses enshrines the principles of cooperation, equitable sharing, and no significant harm. However, neither Egypt nor Ethiopia has ratified this convention. The absence of a binding framework therefore allows each country to interpret the rules of law in its own way, reinforcing mutual mistrust. This legal vacuum undermines any attempt at mediation based on universal standards and gives rise to a conflict of diplomatic interpretations.
In a context of climate change, where water resources are becoming increasingly precious, this dispute over the GERD illustrates the potential future conflicts that could arise around scarcity. The Nile, once seen as a factor of cultural and historical unity, is gradually becoming a source of division and confrontation. Some researchers refer to the possibility of “hydro-hegemony,” a concept referring to the power of one state to dominate others through control of water resources. To date, Egypt has long exercised this hegemony, but the GERD could symbolize a shift, a redistribution of the water cards.
Beyond the political issues, the GERD could have a major environmental impact on the Nile basin. The prolonged retention of water behind the dam could disrupt the river’s ecosystem, particularly the wetlands of Sudan and southern Egypt, which are home to unique biodiversity. In Egypt, the salinization of the delta’s land, exacerbated by the decline in river flow, could lead to a loss of fertile agricultural land. Furthermore, climate change could make hydrological cycles even more unpredictable, exacerbating conflicts over the filling of the dam during dry years. A thorough environmental analysis, shared between the three countries, is currently cruelly lacking.
The tensions surrounding the Nile are not only geostrategic: they have a direct impact on local populations. In Egypt, more than 80% of water is used for agriculture. According to some projections, a 10-15% reduction in the Nile’s flow could result in the loss of hundreds of thousands of hectares of arable land and threaten the livelihoods of more than 1.5 million farmers. Growing urbanization, demographic pressure, and pollution further exacerbate the situation. On the Ethiopian side, a slowdown in the project could prevent millions of rural households from accessing electricity, hampering human development efforts. The Nile, a source of life, is thus becoming a social divide between countries and within their populations.
The future of the Nile Basin will depend largely on the ability of the countries concerned to overcome historical antagonisms. It is necessary to establish a shared governance framework based on cooperation, transparency, and water solidarity. A multilateral mechanism combining technical expertise, independent arbitration, and security guarantees could offer a sustainable solution. This also implies mutual recognition of rights to development, water security, and sovereignty. But mistrust remains strong. Rising nationalism, public pressure, internal instability, and foreign interference make compromise difficult. The next few years will be decisive. Either the countries of the Nile basin will succeed in building an exemplary model of cooperation that could inspire other regions facing the same challenges, or rivalries will become entrenched, turning the river into a dividing line with potentially dramatic consequences.
Two scenarios are emerging. The first, conflictual scenario would see the rise of water nationalism, with rigid positions, mutual accusations, and diplomatic hardening. In such a context, unilateral projects are likely to multiply, populations would suffer from supply disruptions, and the river would become a theater of permanent tensions. The second scenario, more cooperative, would involve the establishment of a binding tripartite agreement, backed by shared hydrological monitoring mechanisms, concerted management of drought periods, and energy solidarity. Such an agreement would transform the Nile into a vehicle for regional integration, provided that the logic of domination is overcome and a long-term vision based on interdependence is adopted.
Julien J.
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